We present a formal model of negotiation between autonomous agents. The purpose of the negotiation is to reach an agreement about the provision of a service by one agent for another. The model de nes a range of strategies and tactics that agents can employ to generate initial o ers, evaluate proposals and o er counter proposals. The model is based on computationally tractable assumptions, demonstrated in the domain of business process management and empirically evaluated.
Introduction
Autonomous agents are being increasingly used in a wide range of industrial and commercial domains 2]. These agents have a high degree of self determination { they decide for themselves what, when and under what conditions their actions should be performed. In most cases, such agents need to interact with other autonomous agents to achieve their objectives (either because they do not have su cient capabilities or resources to complete their problem solving alone or because there are interdependencies between the agents). The objectives of these interactions are to make other agents undertake a particular course of action (e.g. perform a particular service), modify a planned course of action (e.g. delay or bring forward a particular action so that there is no longer a con ict), or come to an agreement on a common course of action. Since the agents have no direct control over one another, they must persuade their acquaintances to act in particular ways (they cannot simply instruct them). The paradigm case of persuasion is negotiation { a p r ocess by which a joint decision is made by two or more p arties. The parties rst verbalise contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process of concession making or search for new alternatives, (cf. 9]).
Given its pervasive nature, negotiation comes in many shapes and forms. However in this work we a r e i n terested in a particular class of negotiation { namely service-oriented n e gotiation. I n t h i s c o n text, one agent (the client) requires a service to be performed on its behalf by some other agent (the server) 2 . N egotiation involves determining a contract under certain terms and conditions. The negotiation may be iterative i n t h a t s e v eral rounds of o ers and counter o ers will occur before an agreement is reached or the negotiation is terminated.
When building an autonomous agent which is capable of exible and sophisticated negotiation, three broad areas need to be considered 8] { what negotiation protocol will be used?, what are the issues over which negotiation takes place?, and what reasoning model will the agents employ? This paper concentrates predominantly on the nal point although the protocol and negotiation object are brie y de ned. A comprehensive reasoning model for service-oriented negotiation should determine: which potential servers should be contacted, whether negotiation should proceed in parallel with all servers or whether it should run sequentially, what initial o ers should be sent o u t , what is the range of acceptable agreements, what counter o ers should be generated, when negotiation should be abandoned, and when an agreement i s reached.
To this end, this paper presents a formal account of a negotiating agent's reasoning component {in particular it concentrates on the processes of generating an initial o er, of evaluating incoming proposals, and of generating counter proposals. The model speci es the key structures and processes involved in this endeavour and de nes their inter-relationships. The model was shaped by practical considerations and insights emanating from the development of a system of negotiating agents for business process management ( s e e 6] and Section 2 for more details). The main contributions of this work are: (i) it allows rich and exible negotiation schemes to be de ned (ii) it is based on assumptions which are realistic for autonomous computational agents (see Section 3.3 for the set of requirements and Section 7 for a discussion of related approaches), iii) it has been empirically e v aluated (see Section 6) and (iv) it presents some initial results on the convergence of negotiation (this aspect is not discussed in this paper, but refer to 13] for more details).
In this paper we concentrate on many-parties, many-issues, single-encounter negotiations with an environment of limited resources (time among them). Section 2 gives details of the type of applications and scenarios we are interested in. Sections 3 to 5 present the proposed model and in section 6 the model is empirically evaluated. Finally, related work and some future avenues of work are outlined in sections 7 and 8 respectively.
Service-Oriented Negotiation
This section characterises a context in which service oriented negotiation takes place. The scenario is motivated by w ork in the ADEPT project 6] which h a s developed negotiating agents for business process management applications. However, we believe that the characteristics emerging from this domain have a wide variety of application. To p r o vide a detailed context for this work, a m ulti-agent system for managing a British Telecom (BT) business process is presented (section 2.1). This scenario is then analysed in terms of its key characteristics and assumptions as they relate to the process of negotiation (section 2.2).
BT's Provide Customer Quote Business Process
This scenario is based on BT's business process of providing a quotation for designing a network to provide particular services to a customer ( gure 1) 3 . The overall process receives a customer service request as its input and generates as its output a quote specifying how m uch i t w ould cost to build a network to realise that service. It involves up to six agent t ypes: the sales department agent, the customer service division agent, the legal department agent, the design division agent, the surveyor department a g e n t, and the various agents who provide the out-sourced service of vetting customers.
The process is initiated by the sales agent w h i c h negotiates with the CSD agent (mainly over time, but also over the number of invocations and the form in which the nal result should be delivered) for the service of providing a customer quote. The rst stages of the Provide Customer Quote service involve the CSD agent capturing the customer's details and vetting the customer in Fig. 1 . Agent system for BT's provide customer quote business process terms of their credit worthiness. The latter sub-service is actually performed by one of the VC a g e n ts. Negotiation is used to determine which V C agent should be selected { the main attributes negotiated over are the price of the service, the penalty for contract violation, the desired quality of the service and the time by w h i c h the service should be performed. If the customer fails the vetting procedure, then the quote process terminates. Assuming the customer is satisfactory, the CSD agent maps their requirements against a service portfolio. If the requirements can be met by a standard o -the-shelf portfolio item then an immediate quote can be o ered based on previous examples. In the case of bespoke services, however, the process is more complex. The CSD agent negotiates with the DD agent ( o ver time and quality) for the service of designing and costing the desired network service. In order for the DD agent to provide this service it must negotiate with the LD agent ( o ver time) and perhaps with the SD agent. The LD agent c hecks the design to ensure the legality of the proposed service (e.g. it is illegal to send unauthorised encrypted messages across France). If the desired service is illegal, then the entire quote process terminates and the customer is informed. If the requested service is legal then the design phase can start. To prepare a network design it is usually necessary to have a detailed plan of the existing equipment at the customer's premises. Sometimes such plans might not exist and sometimes they may b e out of date. In either case, the DD agent determines whether the customer site(s) should be surveyed. If such a survey is warranted, the DD agent negotiates with the SD agent ( o ver price and time) for the SurveyCustomer Site service. On completion of the network design and costing, the DD agent i nforms the CSD agent which informs the customer of the service quote. The business process then terminates.
The structure of the negotiation object is based almost directly on the legal contracts used to regulate agreements in the current m a n ual approach to business process management. This structure is fairly rich a n d c o vers both service and meta-service attributes. In more detail, it contains: (i) the service name (ii) a unique agreement i d e n ti er (covering the case where there are multiple agreements for the same service) (iii) the agents involved in the agreement (client and server) (iv) the type of agreement (one o agreement for a single service invocation versus on-going agreements for multiple invocations of the same service) (v) timing information (duration represents the maximum time the server can take to nish the service, and start time and end time represent the time during which the agreement i s v alid) (vi) the volume of invocations permissible between the start and end times (for on-going agreements only) (vii) the price paid per invocation (viii) the penalty the server incurs for every violation of the agreement (ix) the information the client m ust provide to the server on service invocation and (x) the policy used for disseminating the service's intermediate and nal results to the client.
Characteristics and Assumptions
The following negotiation characteristics can be noted from the ADEPT business process scenario. Moreover, it is believed that these characteristics are likely to be common to a wide range of service oriented negotiations between autonomous agents. { A given service can be provided by more than one agent (e.g. multiple agents can provide the vet customer service to the CSD agent). The available services may b e i d e n tical in their characteristics or they may v ary along several dimensions (e.g. quality, price, availability, etc.). { Individual agents can be both clients and servers for di erent services in di erent negotiation contexts. { Negotiations can range over a number of quantitative (e.g. price, duration, and cost) and qualitative (e.g. type of reporting policy, and nature of the contract) issues. Each successful negotiation requires a range of such issues to be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties. Agents may be required to make trade-o s between issues (e.g. faster completion time for lower quality) in order to come to an agreement. { The social context and inter-relationships of the participants in uences the way a g e n ts negotiate. Some negotiations involve e n tities within the same organisation (e.g. between the CSD and DD agents) and hence are generally cooperative in nature. Other negotiations are inter-organisational and purely competitive {i n volving self interested, utility maximising agents (e.g. between the VC agents and the CSD agent). Some groups of agents often negotiate with one another for the same service (e.g. the CSD and DD agents), whereas other negotiations are more open in nature (for example, the set of VC a g e n ts changes frequently and hence the CSD agent often negotiates with unknown agents). { As the agents are autonomous, the factors which in uence their negotiation stance and behaviour are private and not available to their opponents (especially in inter-organisational settings). Thus agents do not know what utilities their opponents place on various outcomes, they do not know what reasoning models they employ, they do not know their opponent's constraints and they do not know whether an agreement i s e v en possible at the outset (i.e. the participants may h a ve non-intersecting ranges of acceptability). { Since negotiation takes place within a highly intertwined web of activity (the business process) time is a critical factor. Timings are important o n two distinct levels: (i) the time it takes to reach an agreement m ust be reasonable and (ii) the time by w h i c h the negotiated service must be executed is important in most cases and crucial in others. The former means that the agents should not become involved in unnecessarily complex and time consuming negotiations { the time spent negotiating should be reasonable with respect to the value of the service agreement. The latter means that the agents sometimes have hard deadlines by w h i c h agreements must be in place (this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely coordinated).
The Negotiation Model
The negotiation model in this section is based on a variation of the two parties, many issues value scoring system presented in 10]. That is, a model for bilateral negotiations about a set of quantitative v ariables. Our variation transforms that model into a many parties, many issues model (that is, multilateral negotiations about a set of variables). This is important since multilateral negotiations are common in the application domains in which w e are interested. Our model of multilateral negotiations is based on a set of mutually in uencing two parties, many issues negotiations. We will call the sequence of o ers and counter-o ers in a two-party negotiation a negotiation thread. O ers and counter o ers are generated by lineal combinations of simple functions, called tactics. T actics generate an o er, or counter o er, for a single component o f the negotiation object using a single criteria (time, resources, etc.). Di erent weights in the lineal combination allow t h e v arying importance of the criteria to be modelled. For example, when determining values of slots in the negotiation object it may initially be more important t o t a k e i n to account the other agent's behaviour than the remaining time. In which case, the tactics that emphasize the behaviour of other agents will be given greater preference than the tactics which base their value on the amount of time remaining.
However, to achieve exibility in the negotiation, the agents may w i s h t o change their ratings of the importance of the di erent criteria over time. For example, remaining time may become correspondingly more important t h a n the imitation of the other's behaviour as the time by w h i c h an agreement must be in place approaches. We use the term strategy to denote the way i n which a n a g e n t c hanges the weights of the di erent tactics over time. Thus strategies combine tactics depending on the history of negotiations and the internal reasoning model of the agents, and negotiation threads in uence one another by means of strategies (see Section 5) .
Before presenting our model, we i n troduce Rai a's basic model for bilateral negotiation 10] since this forms the basis of our work. The next element of the model is the relative importance that an agent assigns to each issue under negotiation. w i j is the importance of issue j for agent i. We assume the weights of both agents are normalized, i.e. P 1 j n w i j = 1 , f o r all i in fa bg. With these elements in place, it is now possible to de ne an agent's scoring function 4 for a contract { that is, for a value x = ( x 1 : : : x n ) in the multi-dimensional space de ned by the issues' value ranges:
If both negotiators use such an additive scoring function, Rai a showed it is possible to compute the optimum value of x as an element on the e cient frontier of negotiation 5 
Thus we still require a function V j : Q ! 0 1] which establishes the relative importance of each one of the fuzzy values. However, we use the membership function value for x j for each of the fuzzy sets in Q as a multiplying factor in order to obtain it's score value.
By way of an illustration consider the case depicted in gure 2. Assume V j (q 1 ) = 0 :2, V j (q 2 ) = 0 :5, and V j (q 3 ) = 0 :8. We t h e n h a ve V j (x j ) = q 1 (x j )V j (q 1 ) + q 2 (x j )V j (q 2 ) + q 3 (x j )V j (q 3 ), that is V j (x j ) = 0 :75 0:2 + 0:2 0:5 + 0 0:8 = 0 :25. The main advantage of this approach o ver the pure qualitative method is the smooth way i n w h i c h the scoring varies as the value of x j changes.
Service-oriented n e gotiation requirements
The above bilateral negotiation model, suitably extended for qualitative v alues, maybe valid for some service oriented settings. However, the model contains several implicit assumptions that, although they permit good optimisation results, are inappropriate for our needs:
(i) Privacy of information. T o nd the optimum value, the scoring functions have to be disclosed. This is, in general, inappropriate for competitive negotiation. (ii) Privacy of models. Both negotiators have to use the same additive scoring model. However, the models used to evaluate o ers and generate counter o ers are one of the things that negotiators try to hide from one another. (iii) Value restrictions. There are pre-de ned value regions for discussion (they are necessary to de ne the limits of the scoring function). However, it is not always possible to nd these common regions and in many cases negotiation actually involves determining whether such regions even exist. (iv) Time restrictions. There is no notion of timing issues in the negotiation.
However, time is a major constraint o n t h e a g e n t's behaviour 7]. This is mainly true on the client side agents often have strict deadlines by when the negotiation must be completed. For instance, a video link has to be provided at 16:00 because at that time a conference should start negotiation about set up cannot continue after that time. (v) Resource r estrictions. There is no notion of resource issues in the negotiation. However, the quantity of a particular resource has a strong and direct in uence on the behaviour of agents, and, moreover, the correct appreciation of the remaining resources is an essential characteristic of good negotiators. Resources from the client's point of view relate directly to the number of servers engaged in the ongoing negotiation likewise from the server's point of view. Thus, the quantity of resource has a similar e ect on the agents' behaviour as time.
Even just taking the rst consideration alone, it is clear that optimal solutions cannot be found in our domains: it is not possible to optimize an unknown function. Hence, we shall propose a model for individual agent negotiation that seeks to nd deals acceptable to its acquaintances but which, nevertheless, maximise the agent's own scoring function.
3.4 A service-oriented n e gotiation model
In service oriented negotiations, agents can undertake t wo possible roles that are, in principle, in con ict. Hence we shall distinguish (for notational conve-nience) two subsets of agents 6 , Agents = Clients Servers. W e use roman letters to represent a g e n ts c c 1 c 2 : : :will stand for clients, s s 1 s 2 : : :for servers and a a 1 b d e : : :for unspeci c agents.
We adhere to an additive scoring system (section 3.1) in which, for simplicity, the function V a j is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing. In general, clients and servers have opposing interests, e.g. a client w ants a low price for a service, whereas his potential servers attempt to obtain the highest price. High quality is desired by c l i e n ts but not by s e r v ers, and so on. Therefore, in the space of negotiation values, negotiators represent opposing forces in each one of the dimensions. In consequence, the scoring functions verify that given a client c and a server s negotiating values for issue j, then if x j y j 2 min j m a x j ] and x j y j then (V c j (x j ) V c j (y j ) i V s j (x j ) V s j (y j )). However, in a small number of cases the clients and service providers may have a m utual interest for a negotiation issue. For example, Rai a cites a case 10, pg. 133{147] in which the Police O cers Union and the City Hall realize, in the course of their negotiations, that they both want the police commissioner red. Having recognised this mutual interest they quickly agree that this course of action should be selected. Thus, in general, where there is a mutual interest, the variable will be assigned one of its extreme values. Hence these variables can be removed from the negotiation set. For instance, the act of ring the police commissioner can be removed from the set of issues under negotiation and assigned the extreme value "done".
Once the agents have determined the set of variables over which they will negotiate, the negotiation process between two agents (a b 2 Agents) consists of an alternate succession of o ers and counter o ers of values for these variables. This continues until an o er or counter o er is accepted by the other side or one of the partners terminates negotiation (e.g. because the time deadline is reached without an agreement being in place). Negotiation can be initiated by clients or servers.
We represent b y x t a!b the vector of values proposed by a g e n t a to agent b at time t, and by x t a!b j] t h e v alue for issue j proposed from a to b at time t. The range of values acceptable to agent a for issue j will be represented as the interval min a j m a x a j ]. For convenience, we assume a common global time (the calendar time) represented by a linearly ordered set of instants, namely Time, and a reliable communication medium introducing no delays in message transmission (so we can assume that transmission and reception times are identical). The common time assumption is not too strong for our application domains, because time granularity and o er and counter o ers frequencies are not high. Then, The result of I a (t 0 x t b!a ) is used to extend the current negotiation thread between the agents. This interpretation formulation also allows us to model the fact that a contract unacceptable today can be accepted tomorrow merely by the fact that time has passed.
In order to prepare a counter o er, x t 0 a!b , a g e n t a uses a set of tactics that generate new values for each v ariable in the negotiation set. Based on the needs of our business process applications (Section 2), we developed the following families of tactics:
(i) Time-dependent. I f a n a g e n t h a s a t i m e d e a d l i n e b y w h i c h an agreement m ust be in place, these tactics model the fact that the agent i s likely to concede more rapidly as the deadline approaches. The shape of the curve of concession, a function depending on time, is what di erentiates tactics in this set.
(ii) Resource-dependent. These tactics model the pressure in reaching an agreement that the limited resources {e.g. remaining bandwidth to be allocated, money, o r a n y other{ and the environment { e . g n umber of clients, number of servers or economic parameters{ impose upon the agent's behaviour. The functions in this set are similar to the time dependent functions except that the domain of the function is the quantity of resources available instead of the remaining time.
(iii) Imitative. In situations in which t h e a g e n t is not under a great deal of pressure to reach an agreement, it may c hoose to use imitative tactics that protect it from being exploited by other agents. In this case, the counter o er depends on the behaviour of the negotiation opponent. The tactics in this family di er in which aspect of their opponent's behaviour they imitate, and to what degree the opponent's behaviour is imitated.
We do not claim that these family types are complete, nor that we h a ve enumerated all possible instances of tactics within a given family. Rather these are merely the types of tactics we found useful in our applications.
Negotiation tactics
Tactics are the set of functions that determine how to compute the value of an issue (price, volume, duration, quality, ...), by considering a single criteria (time, resources, ...). The set of values for the negotiation issue are then the range of the function, and the single criteria is its domain. The criteria we h a ve chosen, as explained in the previous section, are time, resources and previous o ers and counter o ers.
Given that agents may w ant to consider more than one criterion to compute the value for a single issue, we model the generation of counter proposals as a weighted combination of di erent tactics covering the set of criteria. The values so computed for the di erent issues will be the elements of the counter proposal 8 . F or instance, if an agent w ants to counter propose taking into account t wo criteria: the remaining time and the previous behaviour of the opponent, it can select two tactics: one from the time-dependent family and one from the imitative family. Both of these tactics will suggest a value to counter propose for the issue under negotiation. The actual value which is counter proposed will be the weighted combination of the two suggested values.
To illustrate these points consider the following example. Given an issue j, for which a v alue is under negotiation, an agent a's initial o er corresponds to a value in the issue's acceptable region, (i.e a value in min a j m a It should be noted that not all tactics can be applied at all instants. For instance, a tactic that imitates the behaviour of an opponent is only applicable when the opponent has shown its behaviour su ciently. F or this reason the following description of the tactics pays particular attention to their applicability conditions.
Time-dependent tactics
In these tactics, the predominant factor used to decide which v alue to o er next is time, t. T h us these tactics consist of varying the acceptance value for the issue depending on the remaining negotiation time (an important requirement in our domain |Section 2.2), modelled as the above de ned constant t a max . We model the initial o er as being a point in the interval of values of the issue under negotiation. Hence, agents de ne a constant a j that multiplied by t h e size of the interval determines the value of issue j to be o ered in the rst proposal by agent a.
We model the value to be uttered by a g e n t a to agent b for issue j as the o er at time t, with 0 t t a max , b y a function a j depending on time as the following expression shows:
min a j + a j (t)(max a j ; min a j ) If V a j is decreasing min a j + ( 1 ; a j (t))(max a j ; min a j ) I f V a j is increasing A wide range of time-dependent functions can be de ned simply by v arying the way in which a j (t) is computed. However, functions must ensure that 0 a j (t) 1, a j (0) = a j and a j (t a max ) = 1. That is, the o er will always be between the value range, at the beginning it will give the initial constant and when the time deadline is reached the tactic will suggest to o er the reservation value 9 . W e distinguish two families of functions with this intended behaviour: polynomial and exponential (naturally, others could also be de ned). Both families are parameterised by a v alue 2 < + that determines the convexity degree (see Figure 3 ) of the curve. We c hose these two families of functions because of the very di erent w ay they model concession. For the same big value of , the polynomial function concedes faster at the beginning than the exponential one, then they behave similarly. F or a small value of , t h e exponential function waits longer than the polynomial one before it starts conceding { Polynomial. a j (t) = a j + ( 1 ; a j )( min(t tmax) tmax ) 1 { Exponential. a j (t) = e (1; min(t tmax) tmax ) ln a j These families of functions represent an in nite number of possible tactics, one for each v alue of . H o wever to better understand their behaviour we h a ve classi ed them, depending on the value of , i n to two extreme sets showing clearly di erent patterns of behaviour. Other sets in between these two could also be de ned: 9 The reservation value for issue j of agent a represents the value that gives the smallest score for function V a j . The reservation value for agent a and issue j depends on the function V a j and the range min a j m a x a j ]. If V a j is monotonically increasing, then the reservation value is min a j if it is decreasing the reservation value is max a j . 
Resource-dependent tactics
These tactics are similar to the time-dependent ones. Indeed time-dependent tactics can be seen as a type of resource-dependent tactic in which the sole resource considered is time. Whereas time vanishes constantly up to its end, other resources may h a ve di erent patterns of usage. We model resourcedependent tactics in the same way as time-dependent ones, that is, by using the same functions, but by either:
(i) making the value of t a max dynamic (section 4.2.1), or (ii) making the function depend on an estimation of the amount of a particular resource (section 4.2.2).
Dynamic-deadline tactics
The dynamic value of t a max represents a heuristic about how m a n y resources are in the environment. The scarcer the resource, the more urgent the need for an agreement. In our application domains, the most important resource to model is the number of agents negotiating with a given agent and how keen they are to reach agreements. On one hand, the greater the number of agents who are negotiating with agent a for a particular service s, t h e l o wer the pressure on agent a to reach an agreement with any speci c individual.
While on the other hand, the longer the negotiation thread, the greater the pressure on a to come to an agreement. Hence, representing the set of agents negotiating with agent a at time t as: N a (t) = fijx t i$a is activeg, w e de ne the dynamic time deadline for agent a as:
where a represents the time agent a considers reasonable to negotiate with a single agent a n d jx tc i$a j represents the length of the current t h r e a d b e t ween i and a. Notice that the number of agents is in the numerator { so quantity o f time is directly proportional to it, and averaged length of negotiation thread is in the denominator { so quantity o f t i m e i s i n versely proportional to it.
Resource-estimation tactics
These tactics generate counter-o ers depending on how a particular resource is being consumed. Resources could be money being transferred among agents, the number of agents interested in a particular negotiation, and also, in a similar way as before, time. We w ant the agent to become progressively more conciliatory as the quantity of resource diminishes. The limit when the quantity of the resource approaches nil is to concede up to the reservation value for the issue(s) under negotiation. When there is plenty of resource, a more Boulware behaviour is to be expected. Formally, this can be modelled by h a ving a di erent computation for the function : where the function resource(t) measures the quantity of the resource at time t. Examples of functions are:
resource(t) = jN a (t)j. resource(t) = a jN a (t)j 2 P i jx t i$a j . resource(t) = min(0 t max ; t)
In the rst example, the number of negotiating agents is the resource. That is, the more agents negotiating the less pressure in making concessions. The second example models time as a resource in a similar way as in the previous section. The more agents, the less pressure, and the longer the negotiations the more pressure. Finally, the last case is modelling time again as a resource, but in this case the quantity of resource decreases lineally with respect to time.
Behaviour-dependent tactics
This family of tactics compute the next o er based on the previous attitude of the negotiation opponent. These tactics have proved important in co-operative problem-solving negotiation settings 1], and so are useful in a subset of our contexts (see Section 2.2). The main di erence between the tactics in this family is in the type of imitation they perform. One family imitates proportionally, another in absolute terms, and the last one computes the average of the proportions in a number of previous o ers. Hence, given a negotiation thread f: : : (ii) Random Absolute Tit-For-Tat
The same as before but in absolute terms. It means that if the other agent decreases its o er by $2 , then the next response should be increased by the same $2 . M o r e o ver, we add a component that modi es that behaviour by increasing or decreasing (depending on the value of parameter s) t h e v alue of the answer by a random amount. (This is introduced as it can enable the agents to escape from local minima.) M is the maximum amount b y w h i c h a n a g e n t can change its imitative b ehaviour. The condition of applicability i s a g a i n n > 2 . 5 Negotiation strategies
The aim of agent a's negotiation strategy is to determine the best course of action which will result in an agreement o n a c o n tract x that maximises its scoring function V a . In practical terms, this equates to how to prepare a new counter o er.
In our model we consider that the agent has a representation of its mental state containing information about its beliefs, its knowledge of the environment (time, resources, etc.), and any other attitudes (desires, goals, obligations, intentions, etc.) the agent designer considers appropriate 11 . The mental state of agent a at time t is noted as MS t a . W e denote the set of all possible mental states for agent a as MS a .
When agent a receives an o er from agent b it becomes the last element i n t h e current negotiation thread between both agents. If the o er is unsatisfactory, agent a generates a counter o er. As discussed earlier, di erent combinations of tactics can be used to generate counter o ers for particular issues. An agent's strategy determines which combination of tactics should be used at any o n e instant. Hence, the following de nition:
De We model many-parties negotiations by means of a set of interacting negotiation threads. The way this is done is by making a negotiation thread in uence the selection of which matrix ; is to be used in other negotiation threads. 
A simplistic example of the application of our model would be to have a matrix ; built up of 0s and 1s and having ; t+1 a!b = ; t a!b for all t. T h i s w ould correspond to using a xed single tactic for each issue at every instant i n t h e negotiation.
Experimental Evaluation of the Negotiation Model
The model we h a ve presented de nes and formalises a range of negotiation behaviours. However, we canot say from the theoretical model alone which of these behaviours will be successful in which negotiation contexts (since there are too many i n terrelated variables and too wide a range of situations to consider). Therefore our approach is to empirically evaluate the main parameters of the model with the nal aim of determining the most successful behav i o u r s i n v arious types of situations. At this stage, however, our investigation is focused on determining the behaviour and inter-dependencies of the model's basic constituent elements. This analysis will then lay the foundation for subsequent experimental work. To t h i s e n d , w e concentrate solely on the behaviour of pure tactics (i.e we exclude strategies that combine several tactics).
The experiments involve selecting a particular tactic, generating a range of random environments, then allowing the agent to negotiate using the chosen tactic against an opponent who employs a range of other tactics. Various experimental measures related to the negotiations are then recorded. In particular, Section 6.1 de nes the experimental environments and the tactics, Section 6.2 describes the experimental measures, and nally section 6.3 describes the experimental hypotheses, the procedures and discussion of the results.
Environments and Tactics
Negotiation takes place in a particular context or environment. Environments are characterised by the number of agents they contain, the issues which are being discussed, the deadlines by when agreements must be reached, and the expectations of the agents. Since there are in nitely many potential environments, we need to nd a means of selecting a representative and nite subset in which w e can assess an agent's negotiation performance.
To this end, the rst simpli cation involves limiting ourselves to bilateral negotiation between a single client and server over the single issue of price. Given this situation, the experimental environment is uniquely de ned by the following variables: t c max t s max c s m i n c price max c price m i n s price max s price ]. We c o m -pute the negotiation interval (the di erence between the agent's minimum and maximum values) for price using two v ariables: a and . The variable a is the length of the negotiation interval for an agent a. is the degree of intersection between the negotiation intervals of the two a g e n ts and it ranges between 0 (full overlap) and 0:99 (almost non-overlapping reservations). For each environment, we assigned min c price = 10 and randomly select a between the ranges of f10 30g for both agents. We then compute the negotiation intervals in the following way: max c = min c + c min s = c + min c max s = min s + s Note that the server's minimum reservation value is never lower than the client's minimum. This is because we are not interested in degenerate negotiation contexts where a server's o er is below a client's minimum and is immediately accepted. This method of generating reservation values also means a deal is always possible since there is always some degree of overlap.
The second simpli cation involves selecting a nite range of tactics since the theoretical model allows for an in nite set (e.g the range of is in nite which means there are in nitely many time-dependent tactics). Therefore for analytical tractability w e let the set of tactics used in the experiments be bound to a limited number of groups whose members could, however, be equally selected for a game. We c hose nine experimental tactic groups three each from the time-dependent, resource-dependent and behaviour-dependent families. We c hose an equal number for each family to ensure that the tactic population is uniform and the results are not skewed by h a ving more encounters with a particular type of tactic.
The three time-dependent families were chosen with ranges for parameter which correspond to a Boulware, a Linear and a Conceder ( was respectively sampled between 0:01 0:2], 1 1] and 20 40]). We c hose the exponential function for Boulwa r e b e c a u s e a t l o w v alues of they are more Boulware than the polynomials. However, polynomial function were selected for Linears and Conceders because only the polynomial function produces a linear behaviour at = 1 (see gure 3) and because to Conceders they are more conciliatory initially than the exponentials. The three resource-dependent tactics (Thread1, Thread2 and Thread3) view the length of the thread as their main resource. The di erences between these tactics relate to the amount of time they consider reasonable for negotiation (set by the parameter ). To compare the behaviours of this family we set = 1 for Thread1 and sampled between the ranges 6 10] for Thread2 and between 11 15] for Thread3. Since we only have one client and one server the value of parameter N remains constant at 1. Finally, relative, random and average titfortat tactics represent t h e behaviour-dependent family. W e c hose = 1 for the relative and random tactics and = 2 for the average tactics. We did not sample these tactics because we w ant them to be applicable at the earliest possible opportunity. W h e n a behaviour-dependent tactic is not applicable, the policy is to o er the value suggested by a as the rst o er then concede by a certain amount 1]. We chose a polynomial time-dependent tactic to compute the next o er with 2 f 1 3g. F or random tactics we l e t R(M) be sampled between 1 to 3 percent of the initial o er.
Each tactic group is then sampled for every environment s i n c e w e are interested in the behaviour of tactic families rather than single concrete tactics. For each e n vironment e k , w h e r e k indexes the various environments, we d e n e two matrices representing the outcomes of the client, game e k c , and the server, game e k s , when playing particular tactics. We index the client's tactics by t h e rows i and the server's by the columns j, s o game e k c i j] is the outcome of the client when playing tactic i with server playing tactic j. E a c h tactic plays against all other tactics in each e n vironment, hence 1 i j 9.
Experimental Measures
To e v aluate the e ectiveness of the tactics we consider the following measures which calibrate: i) the intrinsic bene t of the tactic family to an agent (section 6.2.1) ii) the cost adjusted bene t which moderates the intrinsic bene t with some measure of the cost involved in achieving that bene t (section 6.2.2) and iii) the performance of the intrinsic utility relative to a game of perfect information (section 6.2.3).
Intrinsic Agent Utility
The intrinsic bene t is modeled as the agent's utility for the negotiation's nal outcome when using a tactic family in a given environment independently of the time taken and the resources consumed 12]. This utility, U e k a , is calculated for each agent for a price x as: where determines the degree of convexity of the utility function. In this case, we c hose = 1 corresponding to a linear scoring function for all agents 13 . 13 We c hose to model utilities as polynomials so that we could experiment with non-linear utilities in future.
If no deal is made in a particular negotiation, then we assign zero to both U e k c and U e k s . H o wever, by de ning agent utilities in this manner we could not distinguish between deals made at reservations and no deals. Therefore to evaluate a tactic's performance we also computed intrinsic utility for cases in which a deal was indeed made.
The outcomes of the negotiations, as presented in the previous subsection, are represented in the matrices game e k a . Hence the utility for a client c when negotiating using a tactic i against a server s using tactic j in environment e k is U e k c (game e k c i j]).
Cost Adjusted Bene t
In addition to knowing the intrinsic utility t o a n a g e n t for using a particular tactic, we are also interested in knowing the relationship between an outcome's utility and the costs the tactic imposes on the agents. Therefore the cost adjusted bene t of tactic pairs i and j in environment e k is de ned as follows: B e k a i j] = U e k a i j] ; C e k a i j] To de ne the cost function, C, w e i n troduce the notion of a system. A system in these experiments is a set of resources that can be used by the agents during their negotiations. The usage of these system resources is subject to a tax T which is levied on each message communicated between the agents. Therefore the greater the communication between the agents, the greater the cost to the agents, and the greater the system revenue. The amount o f c o m m unication in a particular negotiation is simply the total number of messages exchanged between the agents. So, we de ne the cost to an agent a s : C e k c i j] = C e k s i j] = tanh(jx c i $s j j T )
where jx c i $s j j is the length of the thread at the end of negotiation between a client using tactic i and and a server using tactic j, tanh is an increasing function that maps the real numbers into 0 1]. T determines the rate of change of tanh(). We sampled T between the ranges of 0:001 0:1]. In short, the greater the taxation system, the more costly the communication, and the quicker the rate at which the cost rises to an agent for each message.
Experimental Controls: The Perfect Information Game
All the measures so far have been designed to calibrate the performance of the tactics within our model. However, we also need to calibrate the performance of our tactics with respect to some control conditions so that we can relate our work with that of others. Game Theory, Economics and Voting Theory have all proposed desirable properties and solution criteria that can be used to characterise an agent's negotiation. Typically, these properties and criteria are concerned with the in uence of the individual agent on the outcome or conversely the in uence of the outcome on the individual. 
Average Utilities
To produce statistically meaningful results, we analyse the in uence of each tactic family, on the above utilities, averaged across a number of environments and summed against all other tactics for each agent. Therefore our analysis is based on the performance of a tactic family across all other tactic families. The precise set of environments is sampled from the parameters speci ed in section 6.1 and the number of environments used is 200 with the probability of the sample mean deviating by more than 0:01 from the true mean being less than 0:05.
The average utility for clients was updated at the end of every game played in each e n vironment according to:
U e k c i j] = U e k;1 c i j] k ; 1 k + U(game e k c i j]) k and similarly for servers. The other measures were also handled in the same way.
Hypotheses and Results
The experiments considered here relate to two main components of the negotiation model: i) the amount o f t i m e a vailable to make an agreement, t a max and ii) the relative v alue of the initial o er, a . T o test the e ects of varying deadlines on agreements, we classify the experiments into environments where the time to reach an agreement is large (6.3.1) and environments where the time is small (6.3.2). Likewise for initial o ers. We classify the environments into two t ypes: those where the initial o er is distributed at the minimum of the agent's reservation values and those where the initial o er is distributed near the maximum of the reservation values (6.3.3). The reservation values were computed as described in section 6.1 with c = s = 30 and = 0. The reader is referred to gure 4 for the key to the experimental tactics. Each k ey is further post xed by the role of an agent (e.g BC and BS denote a client and a server playing a Boulware tactic respectively).
To help clarify the behaviour of the agents, we trace the behaviour of timedependent and resource-dependent tactics for di erent deadlines in gure 5 14 .
Because the behaviour of imitative tactics is a function of their interactions with other tactics in the population, we do not include them in this gure. For a similar reason, most of the discussion of results will be based on the behaviour of the time and resource dependent tactics since it is their behaviour which determines the behaviours of imitative tactics.The gradient of approach t o reservation values increases as time decreases for the time-dependent tactics making arrival to the cross over in acceptance levels (a point i n t i m e a t w h i c h submitted bids are mutually acceptable) ealier in time. Boulware is almost a step function which begins to concede much later than the others. Linear and Conceder approach their reservation values at an even a faster rate when their deadlines are reduced. The behaviour of resource-dependent tactics, on the other hand, is independent of the time limit. All three tactics initially have an almost linear rate of change which begins to reach an asymptote as they approach their reservation values. They di er, from one another, in that none 
Long Term Deadlines
Our hypotheses about the e ect of long term deadlines can be stated as follows:
Hypothesis1: In environments where the deadline for negotiation is large, tactics which quickly approach their reservation values will make more d e als than tactics which have a slower rate of approach. However, the deals made will be at the reservation values and so will have less intrinsic utility than those tactics whose rate of approach is slower.
Hypothesis2: The utility to the system will be high when tactics have long deadlines since l a r ge numbers of o ers will be exchanged. Consequently, the agents will gain relatively less cost adjusted utility.
We de ne an environment with long term deadlines as one in which the values of t c max and t s max are sampled within 30 60] ticks of a discrete clock. Note that we allow t c max t s max and t c max < t s max . Since high values of a overconstrain the true behaviour of tactics, we set = 0 :1 for both agents. We t h e n r u n the experiments in two h undred environments. In each e n vironment the client begins the bidding process. Our rst observation is that there is a di erence in intrinsic utility b e t ween the client and the server, with the client gaining more utility than the server for all tactics (Figure 6 .A). This is an unexpected result because we believed that given su cient n umbers of sampled environments a client a g e n t should, on average, gain the same utility as a server agent f o r a g i v en tactic. To explain this di erence we h ypothesised that the observed di erence in the utilities is caused by the way relative-titfortat and average-titfortats compute their offers. These latter tactics compute their next o er based on the product of the quotient b e t ween counter o ers of the opponent and the previous o er the agent (section 4. the value of $20 for the client a n d $200 for the server with the result that this concession \pulls" down the server's o er faster than \pushing" the client's o er up. We tested this hypothesis by removing the behaviour-dependent t a ctics from the experimental groups. We replaced them with three additional time-dependent tactics with 2 f 0:25 0:4g, 2 f 0:4 0:7g and 2 f 0:7 0:9g (Boulware2, Boulware3 and Boulware4 respectively) whose behaviour becomes progressively linear with increasing values for . As gure 6.B shows, this did indeed reduce the di erences between the client and the server.
However, signi cant di erences remain between the client and the server for tactics which are conciliatory (i.e Conceder and Thread1). We h ypothesised that the reason for this residual di erence is due to the order of who begins the negotiation process. The execution control in our experimental procedure means that the client a l w ays starts the negotiation at t = 0 , f o l l o wed by t h e server at t = 1, and so on. For the client the value of c price (0) = c price ( gure 5.C and section 4.1). However, the server's rst o er is based on s price (1) and when > 1 the polynomial almost concede to the reservation at the t = 1. Therefore a client who starts the negotiation process always reaches c price (t c max ) = 1 before the server. The same is true for the behaviour of Thread1. To test this hypothesis we c hanged the experimental procedure to randomly select who goes rst in each e n vironment. As Figure 6 .C shows, the utility b e t ween a client and a server is equal if we randomly select who goes rst. For the remainder of the experiments, we re-introduce the behaviourdependent tactics into the population and randomly select who goes rst. Having re ned our experimental procedure, we return to the task of tactic evaluation. Figure 7 .A shows the intrinsic agent utility for all tactic pairs (which includes the utility for both deals and no deals), while gure 7.B is the same measure but only for the cases where a deal was made (see section 6.2.1). Finally, gure 7.C shows the percentage of successful deals for tactic pairs. We predicted that a tactic which approaches reservations at the slowest rate (i.e a Boulware) should rank the highest in average utility. H o wever, from gure 7.A we o b s e r v e that the actual dominant tactic when there is plenty o f time for negotiation is a linear type of tactic (Linear, Thread3 and Thread2), followed closely by behaviour-dependent tactics. Note, imitative tactics never do better than other tactics the best they can do is to gain equal utility a s t h e best tactic 1]. To help explain this deviation from our predictions, we note that the Boulware tactics make signi cantly fewer deals than all the other tactic families ( gure 7.C). Taking this into account, we examined the average intrinsic utility for cases in which deals are made ( gure 7.B). This shows that when Boulwares do make deals, they do indeed receive a high individual utility. F rom these observations and the data from gure 6.C, we conclude our initial hypothesis does not hold because of the composition of the tactic population. We predicted that in an environment which there is plenty o f t i m e to reach a deal, Boulware should rank higher than tactics that approached reservation values quickly. H o wever, the combined observations from gure 6.C and gure 7.A suggest that there exists a limited range of values for the rate of change of acceptance levels that performs best. The Boulware tactics in 7.A are represented by 2 f 0:01 0:2g which g i v es rise to very rigid tactics which r a r e l y c hange their o ers. However, as Boulware becomes less xed and more Linear, as in gure 6.C, they are more successful. LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  REC  RES  RAC  RAS Figure 8 shows the outcomes of the experiments with respect to system utility (8.A), cost adjusted bene ts (8.B) and control measures (8.C). Our hypothesis with respect to the system utility is con rmed the tactic that uses the most system resource is Boulware, and the least is the conceder family. In addition, although a Boulware tactic has a higher intrinsic agent utility than conceder type tactics (Conceder and Thread1 gure 7.A), when the the cost of communication is taken into consideration the converse is true. The cost adjusted utilities of other tactics have similar magnitude. The reason for this is that the cost adjusted bene t, which is the product of the intrinsic utility a n d a function of the number of exchanged messages (see 6.2.2), is sensitive to large uctuations in the product and assigns similar utilities to non-extreme values.
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Finally, w e observe that the comparison of our tactics with respect to the controls follows the same broad pattern as the intrinsic agent utility. Linear type tactics (Linear, Thread1 and Thread3) perform better than the controls and the Conceder types (Conceder and Thread1) perform worst. This is to be expected since the closer the tactic's selected deal to the Pareto optimal deal (intrinsic utility of 0.5), the closer to zero the di erential between the intrinsic utility and the control utility becomes. As we can see from gure 7.A, the only tactics which approach or exceed an average intrinsic utility of 0.5 are linear type tactics, (namely Linear, Thread2 and Thread3), followed by t h e behaviour-dependents, then Boulware and, nally, conceder type tactics.
Short Term Deadlines
A c hange in the environmental setting can mean a radical change in the successfulness of a particular family of tactics. Therefore we carried out an experiment t o i n vestigate the behaviour of tactics in environments where the deadlines are short (cf. 6.3.1). For this case, our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis3: When there is a short time frame to negotiate, tactics which quickly approach their reservation values will make more d e als and gain relatively more intrinsic utility than tactics whose rate of approach to the reservation is slow.
Hypothesis4: Since d e adlines are short, the number of messages exchanged to reach a deal will be small. Consequently the system utility will be low and the cost adjusted utility will be high.
Short term deadlines are obtained by sampling a pair of values for t c max t s max ] between a low range of values (in this case between 2 10] ticks of a discrete clock). For the reasons outlined above, we set = 0 :1 for both agents and randomly select who starts the bidding process. Again, averages are computed over two h undred environments. Figure 9 shows the results obtained for these experiments. The rst observation is that for most tactics the overall intrinsic utility, the system utility a n d t h e number of deals made ( gures 9 A, C and B respectively) are signi cantly lower than the respective measures for the long deadline experiments. A lower system utility is expected since far fewer messages can be exch a n g e d i n t h e allocated time. Also, because fewer messages are exchanged the agents pay l e s s tax and, consequently, k eep more of the derived utility. The other measures require further analysis.
With long term deadlines, most tactics, apart from Boulware, were making deals approximately, 90% to 95% of the time, whereas with short term deadlines only the Conceder is making similar, although reduced, percentage of deals. This reduction is due to tactics that are either insensitive t o c hanges in their environment o r h a ve a s l o w rate of approach to reservation values (i.e Thread3, Thread2 and Boulware respectively -see gure 5). All other tactics consequently fail to make m a n y deals when interacting with these tactics. Because the length of the thread is independent of the time deadlines the resource-dependent tactics cannot distinguish between short term and long term deadline. This claim is supported by the observation that Thread1 gains equivalent i n trinsic utility independently of deadlines ( gure 9A). Furthermore, resource-dependent tactics are di erentiated with respect to , t h e amount of time an agent considers reasonable to negotiate with another agent. If an agent does not reason about time deadlines and erroneously assumes a value for which is close to or above t max , then it will be unsuccessful in envi-BC   BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  RC  RS  RAC  RAS  REC C   BC  BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  RC  RS  RAC  RAS  REC BC  BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  RC  RS  RAC  RAS  REC ronments where deadlines are important. The relatively low i n trinsic utility o f Thread3 and Thread2 (ranked 9th and 7th respectively -gure 9A) in short term deadline supports this. When deadline is long then resource-dependent tactics with > 1 gain large intrinsic utility because they approach reservation values in a linear way. H o wever, the same behaviour in short term deadlines is less bene cial.
Hypothesis three is supported by the relative reductions in intrinsic utility for Boulware, Thread2 and Thread3 and an increase for Conceder. Whereas in long term deadlines Boulware, Thread2 and Thread3 ranked higher than Conceder the reverse is true for short term deadlines. In short term deadlines, tactics that quickly approach reservation values gain higher intrinsic utility than Boulware type tactics.
Again, we discovered that the dominant tactic is a linear type (i.e Linear and to some extend Thread1) suggesting that the best tactic, independently of time deadlines, is a tactic that approaches reservation values in a linear fashion. The behaviour-dependent tactics also gain relatively high utilities in both cases ranking approximately third and fourth for short and long term deadlines respectively. T h us whereas most tactics have large uctuations in rankings across environments, the behaviour-dependent tactics maintain a stable position, indicating their general robustness and usefulness in a wide range of contexts. Figure 10 con rms our prediction that a server which begins bidding at values near the maximum of V s price ( gure 10.A) has a higher average intrinsic utility than a server that begins bidding at values near the minimum of V s price ( gure 10.B). If s is close to c (the client starts bidding at low v alues and the server begins with high o ers) then both agents gain equivalent utility and take m a n y rounds of negotiations before a deal is found (10.C) because tactics begin their negotiation at some distance from the point in time where bids have v alues which are mutually acceptable. LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  REC  RES  RAC  RAS C   BC  BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  REC  RES  RAC  RAS  AVC A   BC  BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  REC  RES  RAC  RAS D   BC  BS  LC  LS  CC  CS  T1C  T1S  T2C  T2S  T3C  T3S  REC  RES  RAC  RAS  AVC Conversely, i f s is not close to c (both the client and server start bidding at low v alues), then the client bene ts more and the server bene ts less. This is because the initial o ers of the server are now i m m e diately within the acceptance ranges of the client (con rmed by t h e n umber of messages exchanged before a deal is reached ( gure 10.D). Thus the client gains relatively more utility than a server since the initial o ers of both agents are low and deals are made at low v alues 16 .
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We can further explain the in uence of on the behaviour of tactics from the observations shown in gure 11. a is used by all tactics for generating the initial o er but, for exposition purposes, we will only discuss the results with 16 When s is distinctly di erent f r o m c there is little di erention among intrinsic utilities. This is why w e s e t a = 0 :1 for both agents in section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. respect to the Boulware tactic family (since this o ers the greatest di erence in behaviour). When s is low, Boulwares have a l o wer percentage of deals relative to other tactics ( gure 11.A). Conversely, when s is high then Boulware almost equal all other tactics in the percentage of deals they make ( gure 11.B). This is because at low v alues of s the shape of the acceptance levels for a Boulware is almost a step function and a straight l i n e n e a r t o o r a t min s when s is high. A server playing a Boulware tactic makes a small number of high utility deals when the acceptance levels tend towards being a step function (compare gures 11.A and 10.A), but makes larger number of lower utility deals when the acceptance level is almost a straight line ( gures 11.B and 10.B). Therefore, as the value of increases, the likelihood of a deal increases, but the utility of the deal decreases.
Related work
Research in negotiation models has been pursued in di erent elds of knowledge: game theory, social sciences and arti cial intelligence. Each e l d h a s concentrated on di erent aspects of negotiation, making the assumptions that were pertinent for the goal of their study. In game theory, researchers have been interested in mechanism design: the de nition of protocols that limit the possible tactics (or strategies) that can be used by p l a yers. For instance they are interested in de ning protocols that give no bene t to agents that misrepresent or hide information 11]. In this work disclosure of information is acceptable, because by doing so it will bene t the agent in nding an optimal solution for itself. Contrary to our model, and as we discussed in Section 2, this is an inappropriate assumption from the point of view of real applica-tions. As has been argued elsewhere 16], these and other assumptions limit the applicability of game theory models to solve real problems. In a paper in this issue Wellman and Wurman present a justi cation of the adaptation of mechanism design to situations in which disclosure of information is not possible or acceptable 14]. They present m a r k et price systems as institutions that can be used to model resource allocation in general. Our approach a g r e e s with this point of view concerning disclosure of information and complements it in that we concentrate more on the internal decisions of negotiating agents given a particular protocol, and not on the process of mechanism design.
Our interests lie in investigating the process of negotiation among agents and not only on the outcome. Hence, our study, and those forthcoming, are much more in the experimental line of 5]. Although we do not concentrate on learning, some similarities can be found with the formalism by Zeng and Sycara 16]. We h a ve not concentrated however on the description of negotiation protocols that has been an important focus of attention for the community o f distributed arti cial intelligence (see 8] for extensive references).
Discussion and future work
This paper presented a formal model of an autonomous agent's decision function as it relates to the process of service-oriented negotiation. The model de nes a number of tactics which a g e n ts can employ during negotiations and it indicates how a n a g e n t can change these tactics over time to give v arious forms of strategic behaviour. The form of the model, and the assumptions it makes, has been guided by our experiences in developing real-world agent applications for the domain of business process management. For this reason, the model is well suited for practical agent applications.
In earlier work 13], we proved that agents negotiating using our model were guaranteed to converge on a solution in a number of well de ned situations. In this paper, we s o u g h t to extend these results and evaluate the model in a wider range of circumstances. To t h i s e n d , w e de ned a number of basic hypotheses about negotiation using our model and sought t o v alidate them empirically. I n particular, with respect to tactics we d i s c o vered that: (i) irrespective of short or long term deadlines it is best to be a linear type tactic, otherwise an imitative tactic (ii) tactics must be responsive t o c hanges in their environment and (iii) there is a tradeo between the number of deals made and the utility gained which is regulated by the initial o ers.
The aforementioned results con rmed (and rebuted!) a number of basic predictions about negotiation using our model. Our aim for the future is to extend this evaluation to cover a wider range of phenomena. In particular, we i n tend to: (i) extend the analysis to other types of environment classes (for example, we predict that an increase in the number of agents will a ect resourcedependent tactics and dramatically in uence the dynamics of all tactic interactions) (ii) investigate the e ects of strategies, weighted combination of tactics may outperform pure tactics in certain environments (iii) investigate the tactic \pool" which m a k es up the population, we predict that the number and value of deals made between members of a society t h a t i s m a d e u p s o l e l y of Boulwares will be signi cantly di erent to societies where the population has a mixture of Boulwares and imitators. Finally, to gain further explanatory power, we i n tend to analyse the behaviour of tactics, in these and future environments, at the level of pairwise interactions.
